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Abstract
Empirical studies on the relationship between income and happiness commonly
use standard ordered response models, the most well-known representatives being the
ordered logit and the ordered probit. However, these models restrict the marginal
probability effects by design, and therefore limit the analysis of distributional aspects
of a change in income, that is, the study of whether the income effect depend on a
person’s happiness. In this paper we pinpoint the shortcomings of standard models
and propose two alternatives, namely generalized threshold and sequential models.
With data of two waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel, 1984 and 1997, we show
that the more general models yield different marginal probability effects than standard
models.
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1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to point out, and offer a solution to, a methodological short-
coming of the previous literature on the effect of income on happiness in cross sectional
data. Under “happiness” we understand here the response to a survey question such as —
in the German Socio-Economic Panel — “Taken all together, how satisfied are you with
your life today?”, on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “completely dissatisfied” and 10
means “completely satisfied”. There is by now a large literature on the effect of income
on happiness, with data for different countries, different points in time, and using different
specifications. This literature is surveyed, for example, in Frey and Stutzer (2002). Since
the dependent variable “happiness” is measured on an ordinal scale, it is common to employ
standard ordered response models, such as ordered probit and ordered logit, although some
researchers also ignore this issue and use simply OLS (for a discussion see Ferrer-i-Carbonel
and Frijters (2004)).
In either case, previous studies have focused almost entirely on mean effects, i.e. on
estimating the expected happiness response (or expected latent happiness indicator in the
case of ordered response models) to a change in income. Completely missing so far is any
evidence whether the magnitude of the income effect depends on a person’s happiness: is it
possible that the effect of income on happiness is different in different parts of the outcome
distribution? Could it be that “money cannot buy happiness, but buy-off unhappiness” as
a proverb says? And if so, how can such distributional effects be quantified?
Note that the hypothesis of a – possibly negative – relationship between the effect of
income and the level of happiness is different from the hypothesis of a decreasing marginal
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effect of income on happiness as income increases. The two hypotheses are not the same
since income is but one factor affecting happiness, with a myriad of other factors having
been identified as equally or more important in the recent literature (e.g. unemployment,
health, age, etc.), in addition to chance, i.e. individual unobserved factors.
The standard ordered probit or logit models with their specific structure restrict the
distributional effects a-priori without the possibility “to let the data speak”. These models
function as benchmark, against which results from more general models can be compared.
Technically, we require a model that is sufficiently flexible such that the effect of income
on the probabilitiy distribution of happiness is not fully determined by functional form. We
consider two such more general models. The first is a model based on a latent threshold where
the thresholds themselves are linear functions of the explanatory variables. As a second
alternative, we discuss a sequential model which is based on a sequence of binary choice
models for the conditional probability of choosing a higher response category, borrowing
concepts from the literature on discrete duration models. Both models allow for category
specific parameter vectors, possibly but not necessarily different in different parts of the
underlying distribution.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we offer a partial review of the pre-
vious literature on income and happiness. One important lesson is that “getting it right”,
i.e. correctly measuring the effect of income on happiness, will be increasingly important,
as proposals are being made to use happiness surveys in the valuation of public goods and
intangibles. Such valuations can become standard in cost-benefit analyses one day, comple-
menting other methods such as hedonic modeling and contingent valuation, and therefore
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influence whether projects are undertaken or not, and if so, how much compensation should
be paid to inconvenienced parties. This should be reason enough to closely scrutinize the
methodological underpinnings of the previously reported effects.
In Section 3, the methods are presented. We start with a review of the standard ordered
logit and probit models and then contrast them with the generalized threshold and sequential
model. In Section 4, we report on an analysis of the relationship between income and
happiness using data from two waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel, 1984 and 1997.
The results are somewhat mixed. Although we find that income has a stronger effect in the
left part of the happiness distribution than in the utmost right part, the restriction of equal
coefficients (under which the generalized threshold model reduces to the standard ordered
model) can be rejected only for women and not for men. Also, when translated into marginal
probability effects, the extra income sensitivity for low happiness responses (five or below on
a scale from 0 to 10) is at most one percentage points above the prediction of the standard
model. Also, the probability of responding with a high value (for example 8 or above) is in
all cases an increasing function of income. In this sense, there is some evidence that “money
can buy happiness”.
2 Previous Literature
The relationship between income and happiness is perhaps the single most intensively studied
question within the growing literature on the socio-economic determinants of individual
happiness (i.e. reported subjective well-being from personal surveys). The early work in the
field (Easterlin, 1973, 1974, 1995; Scitovsky 1975) answered the rethoric questions “does
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money buy happiness?” and ”will raising the incomes of all increase the happiness of all?”
with a resounding “no”.
This research was motivated by the apparent infatuation of the economics profession with
income maximization, and it reminded us that the ultimate goal of all economic activity
must be human satisfaction and that, according to the empirical evidence, maximizing GDP
would not be ministerial to that goal. The standard explanation why an increased income
for everyone, as measured by GDP growth say, fails to deliver higher levels of happiness –
either in international comparisons or over time – are by now relatively well understood.
Although a ceteris paribus increase in a person’s income leads to higher well being - as is
commonly found in cross section studies (e.g. Frey and Stutzer, 2000, 2002; Gerdtham and
Johannesson, 2001; Gardener and Oswald, 2001; or Shields and Wheatley Price, 2004) - such
an effect is strongly moderated by status and comparison effects in the aggregate (Easterlin,
1995; Clark and Oswald, 1996; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2001; Frijters et al., 2004; among
others).
While the full implications of this insight for economic policy are largely ignored, there
exists another aspect of the cross-sectional relationship between income and happiness that
may yet prove to be of great and lasting practical importance for policy analysis. This second
aspect is related to the potential of income to act as a numeraire, and hence put a price on
everything else that may affect happiness as well. The basic idea is one of compensation:
in the case of a “bad”, how much of an increase in income is required to offset the negative
effect of the bad on happiness, and keep the person at the same level of happiness as in
the absence of the bad? Similarly, in case of a good, one can implicitly determine the
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pecuniary value of the good by asking, how much income a person would be willing to give
up in order to obtain the good, so that the overall happiness is unchanged. Examples for
this line of research are Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) who estimate the money-
equivalent value of the psychological cost of unemployment, and Schwarze (2003) who uses
the principle to determine an income equivalence scale, i.e. the income compensation required
to keep the same individual well-being level with one additional household member present.
Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer (2004) estimate the value of public safety, or the absence of
terrorism. Van Praag and Baarsma (2004) estimate the external cost of air traffic noise for
people living near the Amsterdam Airport. This is a very active area of research, and new
interesting applications are likely to be added in the future.
Importantly, all of this research makes quite restrictive assumptions regarding the way
that income is assumed to effect happiness. Usually, income is entered in logarithms. In this
case the marginal effect is inversely proportional to income: to achieve the same increase in
(average) happiness, larger and larger absolute changes in income are necessary. As argued
above, this may not be sufficiently flexible to measure the true impact of income on happiness,
and the above results may therefore be unreliable.
3 Methods
3.1 Standard Model
Let yi denote the observed ordinal dependent variable, where i = 1, . . . , n and n is the
number of observations. There are J different outcomes coded without loss of generality in
a rank preserving manner such that yi ∈ {1, . . . , J}. The values of yi are determined by an
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unobserved continuous variable y∗i and a partition of the real line:
yi = j if and only if κj ≤ y∗i < κj+1 j = 1, . . . , J
where κ1, . . . , κJ+1 are threshold values and it is understood that κ1 = −∞ and κJ+1 =∞.
Finally, the model is completed by assuming that
y∗i = x
′
iβ + ui
where xi is a k × 1 vector of covariates (excluding a constant), β is a conformable vector of
parameters and u is the error term.
In standard ordered models it is assumed that the threshold values κj are constants
to be estimated together with the regression parameters β. Estimation of the j − 1 + k
parameters by maximum likelihood is straightforward once a distribution function F (u) has
been specified. The likelihood contributions are of the form
P (yi = j|xi) = F (κj+1 − x′iβ)− F (κj − x′iβ) (1)
Let yij = 1 if yi = j and yij = 0 else. For a sample of n independent observations (yi, xi) the
log-likelihood function is given by
lnL(β, κ2, . . . , κj; y, x) =
n∑
i=1
yij lnP (yi = j|xi)
The ordered logit and probit models are obtained by substituting for F the cumulative
density function of the logistic and the standard normal distribution, respectively. For more
details see McKelvey and Zavoina (1975), McCullagh (1980).
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3.2 Interpretation
There are a number of ways to interpret the parameters of this model. What does it mean
for an element of β to be “large” or “small”? First, one might be tempted to interpret
the coefficients in terms of the latent model for y∗i , since this part of the model is a simple
linear regression. However, the β’s are identified only up to scale. Moreover, y∗i , being an
artificial construct, is not of interest. Potentially more interesting is a comparison based on
“compensating variation”. Let xil denote the l-th element of the vector of covariates and βl
the corresponding parameter. Now consider changing two covariates xil and xim at the same
time such that ∆y∗i = 0 (and therefore all probabilities are unchanged). This requires
βl∆xil = −βm∆xim or ∆xil
∆xim
= −βm
βl
If, for example, xil is logarithmic income and xim is unemployment, then the above frac-
tion gives the relative increase in income required to compensate for the negative effect of
unemployment (assuming that βl > 0 and βm < 0).
To move the interpretation closer to the observed outcomes yi, the threshold mechanism
needs to be taken into account. One way of doing this is to ask how much of a change in
a covariate it takes to move over one response category. For this purpose, one can form
the ratio of the interval length to the parameter (κj+1 − κj)/βl. The smaller this ratio (in
absolute terms), the smaller the maximum change in xil required to move the response from
category j to category j + 1.
Such measures stop short of the most natural way of interpreting the parameters in
discrete probability models such as ordered response models, namely in terms of marginal
probability effects. Indeed, the main concern of this paper is to determine how the change in
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a covariate, such as income, changes the distribution of the outcome variable, here subjective
well-being. The marginal probability effects can be obtained directly from equation (1):
MPEjl(xi) =
∂P (yi = j|xi)
∂xil
= [f(κj − x′iβ)− f(κj+1 − x′iβ)]βl (2)
where f is the density function of u. In general, marginal probability effects are functions of
xi. Average marginal probability effects can be obtained by taking expectations:
AMPEjl = Ex
[
∂P (yi = j|xi)
∂xil
]
(3)
A consistent estimator of the AMPEjl is obtained by replacing β in equation (2) with the
maximum likelihood estimator βˆ and averaging over the sample:
̂AMPEjl = 1
n
n∑
i=1
M̂PEjl(xi)
It is interesting to note that despite their intuitive appeal, marginal probability effects are
rarely reported in practice. Among all contributions on the determinants of subjective well-
being listed in the references just three report them, where two of them consider the marginal
effect on the highest outcome only.
Once we focus on the full distribution of outcomes, and the marginal probability effects,
it becomes immediately apparent that standard ordered models are quite restrictive, and
perhaps unnecessarily so. A first way to pinpoint the restrictive nature of the marginal effects
is the observation that their relative magnitude is not allowed to vary over the outcomes.
We obtain
MPEjl(xi)
MPEjm(xi)
=
βl
βm
The relative marginal effects do not depend on j (nor do they depend on xi); in other words,
they are the same in every part of the distribution. It is not possible, for instance, that
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income is more important (relative to unemployment, say) in the left part of the outcome
distribution than in the right part. This property holds regardless of the choice of F .
A second restrictive property is that the sign of the marginal effects for increasing j
is entirely determined by the distribution function F . For example, with F being either
standard normal or logistic, f is bell-shaped with a maximum at 0. Also note that in order
to be well defined, we must have κj ≤ κj+1. It follows from equation (2) that
sgn[MPEjl(xi)] = −sgn[βl] if κj < x′iβ and κj+1 ≤ x′iβ
sgn[MPEjl(xi)] = sgn[βl] if κj ≥ x′iβ and κj+1 > x′iβ
The sign is indeterminate for κj < x
′
iβ and κj+1 > x
′
iβ. The model has a “single crossing”
property. As one moves from the probability of the smallest outcome to the probability of
the largest outcome, marginal probability effects are either first negative and then positive,
or they are first negative and then positive. A reversion is precluded by the assumptions of
the model.
More specific results can be obtained once we consider a specific distribution function F .
The best known result is the proportional log-odds assumption of the ordered logit model.
From equation (1)
P (yi < j|xi) = Λ(κj − x′iβ) =
exp(κj − x′iβ)
1 + exp(κj − x′iβ)
and therefore
P (yi ≥ j|xi)
P (yi < j|xi) =
1− Λ(κj − x′iβ)
Λ(κj − x′iβ)
= exp(−κj + x′iβ)
Hence, the logarithmic odds of an outcome greater or equal than j relative to an outcome
less than j are a linear function of xi. The slope does not depend on the category j.
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The heart of the matter is the single index assumption. In order to obtain more flexible
response patterns for probabilities or odds, one will need to look for a richer parametric
model where index functions are allowed to vary across response categories. In the next two
sections, such models will be discussed. The presented models allow any covariate to have
different effects in different parts of the distribution, relative to what the base model with
constant thresholds would predict.
3.3 Generalized Threshold Models
When searching for more flexible parametric models for ordered dependent variables, the
multinomial logit model stands at one extreme in terms high flexibility. However, it does not
make any use of the ordering information and therefore is inefficient. A very flexible model
that uses the ordering information can be obtained by making the threshold parameters
linear functions of the covariates (e.g., Maddala, 1983, Terza, 1985). Let κij = κ˜j + x
′
iγj,
j = 1, . . . , J where xi is a k × 1 vector of covariates excluding the constant as before.
After substitution κij for κj into equation (1), we obtain
P (yi = j|xi) = F (κ˜j+1 + x′iγj+1 − x′iβ)− F (κ˜j + x′iγj − x′iβ)
= F (κ˜j+1 − x′iβj+1)− F (κ˜j − x′iβj)
where βj = β − γj and it is understood that κ˜1 = −∞ and κ˜J+1 = ∞ as before. Thus,
F (κ˜1 − x′iβ1) = 0 and F (κ˜J+1 − x′iβJ+1) = 1.
The model now contains J−1 parameter vectors β2, . . . , βJ , plus J−1 constants κ˜2, . . . , κ˜J
that can be estimated jointly by maximum likelihood. The generalized model nests the
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standard ordered model under the restriction
β2 = . . . = βJ
Hence, the restricted model has (J − 2)× k additional degrees of freedom. Clearly, the pro-
liferation of parameters, in particular when J is large, is a potential disadvantage. However,
a test can be easily conducted, and one can economize on degrees of freedom by imposing
partial restrictions in subsets of outcomes, such as β2 = β3, while allowing parameters to
differ in other parts of the distribution.
The model has substantially more flexible marginal probability effects, since
MPEjl(xi) = f(κ˜j − x′iβj)βjl − f(κ˜j+1 − x′iβj+1)βj+1,l (4)
All the statements in the previous subsection on constant relative effects and single crossing
no longer need to hold. Rather, these effects can be determined empirically.
In the logit case, we obtain
P (yi < j|xi) = Λ(κ˜j − x′iβj)
and therefore
P (yi ≥ j|xi)
P (yi < j|xi) =
1− Λ(κ˜j − x′iβj)
Λ(κ˜j − x′iβj)
= exp(x′iβj − κ˜j)
The effects of covariates on the log-odds are now category specific.
The greater flexibility in modeling ordered responses with generalized thresholds does
not come without costs. First, the constraint of ascending constants in the standard model
to obtain a well-defined likelihood now extends to
κj − x′iβj ≤ κj+1 − x′iβj+1 ∀i, j (5)
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In a model with generalized thresholds, it is necessary that the multiple indices satisfy the
order restrictions for all observations i. As a practical consequence, the large number of
parameters in conjunction with the order restriction (5) may increase computation time
considerably, as attempts of unproductive likelihood steps are routinely made.
3.4 Sequential Model
For an alternative approach for modeling an ordinal response variable, we now consider
the class of sequential models. This kind of model has been discussed in the statistics
literature (see, for example, Tutz, 1991). However, previous applications in econometrics
are, to the best of our knowledge, non-existent. As before, we assume that the ordered
response variable is coded as j = 1, . . . , J , where j = 1 designates the smallest outcome and
j = J the largest. The basic idea is to cast the model in terms of conditional transition
probabilities P (yi = j|yi ≥ j), j = 1, , . . . , J . These conditionals fully characterize the
probability function of y. For example,
P (yi = 1) = P (yi = 1|yi ≥ 1)P (yi ≥ 1) = P (yi = 1|yi ≥ 1)
P (yi = 2) = P (yi = 2|yi ≥ 2)P (yi ≥ 2) = P (yi = 2|yi ≥ 2)(1− P (yi = 1|yi ≥ 1))
P (yi = 3) = P (yi = 3|yi ≥ 3)P (yi ≥ 3)
= P (yi = 3|yi ≥ 3)[1− P (yi = 1)− P (yi = 2)]
= P (yi = 3|yi ≥ 3)(1− P (yi = 1|yi ≥ 1))(1− P (yi = 2|yi ≥ 2))
and in general
P (yi = j) = P (yi = j|yi ≥ j)
j−1∏
r=0
(1− P (yi = r|yi ≥ r)) j = 1, . . . , J
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where it is understood that P (yi = 0|yi ≥ 0) = 0 and P (yi = J |yi ≥ J) = 1.
This approach is in close analogy to discrete time hazard rate models in duration analysis.
Let tj, j = 1, . . . , J denote the possible exit points, ordered by time. Then P (T = tj|T ≥ tj)
gives the probability of exit at time tj, conditional on survival until tj.
The sequential model naturally accounts for the ordering of the responses without im-
posing any arbitrary cardinality assumption. We don’t claim that the model is a literal
representation of the cognitive processes that are at work when a respondent answers this
type of question. It even appears rather unlikely that individuals actually think that way,
starting with the lowest category, here one, and sequentially choose between one or at least
two, two or at least three, and so on. We rather see the sequential model as a flexible tool
for obtaining a model for ordered responses with unrestricted marginal probability effects.
In order to model the effects of explanatory variables, we can parameterize the model as
follows:
P (yi = j|yi ≥ j, xi) = F (αj + x′iβj)
where αj is a category specific constant, βj is a vector of category specific slopes, and F is
any function mapping real numbers onto the unit interval. The corresponding probability
function is
P (yi = j|xi) = F (αj + x′iβj)
j−1∏
r=0
(1− F (αr + x′iβr)) j = 1, . . . , J (6)
where it is understood that α0 = −∞ and αJ = ∞ such that F (α0 + x′iβ0) = 0 and
F (αJ + x
′
iβJ) = 1. A model with category specific constants only is obtained as a special
case.
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An important advantage of this model over the generalized threshold model is that no re-
strictions on the parameter space are required to ensure the existence of a proper probability
function. This simplifies estimation considerably. On the other hand, due to the increasing
number of terms in (6), the calculation of marginal probability effects becomes somewhat
intractable, in particular for large J , since repeated application of product and chain rules
is required.
But as before, more specific results can be obtained by assuming that F is the cumulative
distribution function of the logistic distribution. In this case, the marginal probability effects
can be derived as
MPEjl(xi) =
∂P (yi = j|x)
∂xil
= P (yi = j|xi)
[1− Λ(αj + x′iβj)]βjl − j−1∑
r=0
Λ(αr + x
′
iβr)βrl

Like in the generalized ordered logit model the effects of a change in one explanatory variable
are now local, i.e. they vary by category j. To estimate the parameters of the model one
needs to perform J − 1 consecutive logit regressions. The dependent variable yij is equal
to one if yi = j and equal to zero if yi > j. In each step, only observations “at risk” are
included, i.e. those for which it is the case that yi ≥ j.
4 Data and Results
In this section we report on the estimation results of the relationship between income and
happiness. We use data from two waves — 1984 and 1997 — of the A-sample of the German
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), i.e. we consider the sample of West Germans (SOEP Group
2001). The dependent variable happiness is the response to the survey question “Taken all
together, how satisfied are you with your life today?”, on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0
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means “completely dissatisfied” and 10 means “completely satisfied”. To avoid cells with
low frequency we combined the categories 0, 1 and 2, as well as the categories 3 and 4,
leaving J = 8 categories for estimation. Explanatory variables include a quadratic in age
(age between 25 and 64), dummy variables for health status, unemployment, logarithmic
household income and logarithmic household size. By entering income and size separately,
we allow for flexible scale effects in utility from consumption at the household level. The
alternative, using per-capita income (or its logarithm) would impose constant returns to
scale (see also Schwarze, 2003). All analyses are performed separately by sex.
— Insert Table 1 about here —
Table 1 summarizes the sample means of selected variables. The descriptive statistics
show that the share of responses in the highest “happiness” categories was markedly lower
in 1997 compared to the year 1984. Overall, people are mostly satisfied with their life:
more than two-thirds of women and men state a happiness level of seven or higher. From a
descriptive point of view, happiness and income are positively related over most of the range,
with the exception of the highest happiness category. Respondents in the highest category
have on average less income than those reporting a high happiness, but not the highest. A
common result known from the previous literature and also supported by the present data
is that among unhappy people the unemployment rate is relatively high, and that reported
health status and happiness are positively correlated.
In the following, we report results from three different models: the standard ordered
response model, the generalized threshold model, and the sequential model, all of them with
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a logistic specification of the error terms. In the discussion, we will emphasize two important
aspects: model selection and testing; and interpretation of the models in terms of marginal
probability effects.
4.1 Model Selection and Testing
Before we start with different procedures of model selection we give estimation results for
one subsample, women 1984, and then illustrate selection criteria by means of this example.
Table 2 reports estimation results for the standard ordered logit model, Table 3 and Table
4 for the generalized threshold and the sequential model, respectively.
— Insert Table 2, 3 and 4 about here —
In the standard ordered logit model the parameter vector β is estimated together with J−
1 = 7 thresholds. All significant parameters have the expected sign. For example household
income and health status have a positive effect on happiness, whereas unemployment has
a negative effect. The relationship between age and happiness is insignificant. We caution
that such an interpretation falls short of the most natural way of interpretation in terms of
marginal probability effects, and can be misleading in a sense that the standard model might
be too restrictive with equal parameter vectors in each part of the outcome distribution.
In the generalized threshold model the estimated parameters differ in each category.
By visual inspection, the coefficients on logarithmic household income are decreasing from
the lowest to the highest category. To test the hypothesis of no change we can conduct a
likelihood ratio (LR) test by computing minus two times the difference of the restricted and
the unrestricted log-likelihood values. The LR statistic is asymptotically χ2-distributed with
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degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions, J − 2 in the case of a single regressor
such as income. For women, 1984 and 1997, we can clearly reject the null hypothesis of
equal income coefficients, whereas for men in both years we cannot reject the hypothesis at
conventional levels of significance.
The null hypothesis of no category specific parameters can be tested in the same manner,
i.e. by computing minus two times the difference of the log-likelihoods of the standard and
the generalized ordered model. For women in 1984 the LR statistic is 104.64, the degrees
of freedom are 36, and thus the null hypothesis of equal coefficients can be highly rejected.
The same result applies for women 1997 and men in both waves. Therefore in either case
the generalized model is preferred to the standard model.
In the sequential logit model the hypothesis of equal coefficients is not a relevant one.
Indeed, equal coefficients, and therefore equal conditional transition probabilities while mov-
ing from j = 1 to j = J , would mean that the marginal probabilities P (yi = j) decrease
monotonically following a geometric decay function. This clearly is not an interesting bench-
mark. The sequential model does not nest the standard ordered logit model. To make the
results comparable across models, we need to consult the marginal probability effects rather
than the parameter values per se. To compare the goodness-of-fit of the two models, we can
use the Akaike Information Criterion. Since the number of parameters is the same in the
sequential and generalized threshold model, this amounts to comparing the log-likelihoods
and choosing the model with the higher value. In the sequential model we can simply sum
the log-likelihoods of each binary logit regression to obtain the overall log-likelihood. In three
cases the generalized ordered logit model is preferred to the sequential model (e.g. women
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1984: −5474.75 > −5479.82), only for men 1997 the log-likelihood value of the sequential
logit is slightly higher.
4.2 Marginal Probability Effects of Income
The use of probability models for ordered responses lends itself to the interpretation of
parameters in terms of marginal probability effects. The question of interest is: How does
the probability of observing a certain outcome j = 1, . . . , J change if one of the explanatory
variables changes? In this paper, we are mainly interested in the effect of a change in income
on the probability of being more or less happy. For female observations in 1984 we reported
the estimated average marginal probability effects ( ̂AMPE) in Tables 2,3 and 4. The results
for women 1997 and men in both years are summarized in Table 5.
— Insert Table 5 about here —
How can we interpret the marginal probability effects precisely? Consider, for example,
the results for men, 1997, and take the ceteris paribus effect of increasing logarithmic house-
hold income by a small amount on the probability of choosing the sixth category (j = 6).
For the standard ordered logit model Table 5 shows a value of 0.0465 (the rows for the
standard model are denoted by “OLogit”). That is, the probability of j = 6 increases by
0.0465 percentage points if we increase ln(hhincome) by 0.01 (this is approximately a 1%
change in level household income). Now take a doubling of household income, i.e. a change
in logarithmic household income of 0.693, keeping household size and everything else con-
stant. The associated change in the probability of j = 6 is about 0.0465× 0.693× 100, a 3.2
percentage point increase. In the generalized ordered logit as well as in the sequential logit
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(rows “GOLogit” and “SLogit”, respectively) the estimated marginal probability effects of
income are considerably larger. They exceed the standard ordered logit effect by more than
50 percent. A doubling in income is predicted to increase the probability of a 6 response by
approximately 5.1 percentage points.
If we compare the average marginal probability effects among the three different models
and over all possible outcomes, we get somewhat mixed results. On one hand, all models
suggest that more income reduces the probability of being unhappy, and increases that of
being happy. On the other hand, there is no systematic under- or over-estimation in the
“restrictive” ordered logit model compared to the generalized models. However, our data
point out in a nice way the shortcomings of the standard model. Consider for example the
estimated marginal probability effects for men in the year 1997. In the generalized ordered
logit and the sequential logit these effects are at first negative, then positive, and then again
negative in the highest category. By design, such a pattern is impossible in the standard
ordered logit model. A similar result appears for women 1984, where the signs switch three
times if marginal probability effets are estimated by the generalized threshold model.
Apart from point estimation of marginal probability effects, sampling variability is also
important. In principle, standard errors can be obtained by the delta method and asymptotic
normality follows from maximum likelihood estimation. However, due to the increasing num-
ber of terms in the marginal probability expressions of the sequential logit model, multiple
chain and product rules are required and bootstrapped standard errors offer an “easy-to-
implement” alternative.
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5 Conclusions
This paper had two main objectives. First, we stressed that the previous literature has mostly
neglected distributional aspects of the effect of income on happiness, and therefore ruled out
different effects on low and high happiness responses, respectively. As mentioned above,
this can become important in future research when happiness surveys are used for valuation
of public goods or intangibles. Secondly, we pinpointed the shortcomings of the standard
ordered response models in analyzing these issues, and proposed several alternatives (the
generalized threshold and the sequential model) that are flexible enough to answer questions
like “Is it true that money cannot buy happiness, but buy-off unhappiness?”
We illustrated these models with data from the 1984 and 1997 waves of the GSOEP. The
main focus was put on model selection and average marginal probability effects. The latter
was discussed in detail since this is the most natural way of interpretating regression coeffi-
cients in conditional probability models. The restrictiveness of standard methods compared
to the more general alternatives was highlighted, e.g. with signs of marginal effects that
are impossible in the standard model. In this sense we let the data speak, and determined
empirically that there is some evidence for “Money can buy happiness”.
Our results are related to three other recent papers who also relax the strict assumptions
of standard ordered models. In a first paper, Clark et al. (2004) take explicitly into account
that unobserved individual heterogeneity may cause different transformations of observable
characteristics into the verbal expression of satisfaction. They apply a latent class approach
to the ordered probit model and show with panel data from twelve European countries that
marginal income effects differ among classes. Secondly, Headey and Wooden (2004) allow for
21
asymmetries in the well-being response to income by using two measures for the lefthand-
side variable from the same survey, one being well-being (or happiness) and the other being
ill-being (or psychological distress). Their results support the hypothesis that income has
the same impact on both measures. Thirdly, Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) consider a
model for state-dependent reporting errors in subjective health measures. They generalize
the threshold values as function of explanatory variables, but focus on predicted probabilities
and not marginal probability effects. A main result is that predictions of reported health
status are sensitive to the labor market status.
However, with very few exceptions (Clark et al., 2004; Shields and Wheatley Price, 2004;
Frey and Stutzer, 2002: ch.4) marginal probability effects have been neglected in the litera-
ture on happiness and income. This paper argued that this does not have to be so necessarily,
and that one needs to go beyond the standard ordered response models if one wants to es-
timate these effects properly. Therefore, we conclude with a strong recommendation that
future work in this area seriously considers the use of more general models.
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Table 2: Estimating happiness by standard ordered logit, sample: women, 1984
coeff. std. err.
ln(hhincome) 0.3725∗∗∗ (0.0570)
ln(hhsize) -0.1479∗ (0.0836)
unemp -0.7394∗∗∗ (0.2242)
health 1.5472∗∗∗ (0.1149)
age 0.0043 (0.0255)
agesq/100 0.0005 (0.0290)
Mean(−x′βˆ) -5.295093
κj j = 1 −∞
j = 2 1.3864 (0.7397)
j = 3 2.4210 (0.7351)
j = 4 3.7767 (0.7356)
j = 5 4.2871 (0.7366)
j = 6 4.9917 (0.7379)
j = 7 6.0579 (0.7401)
j = 8 6.7543 (0.7415)̂AMPEj,ln(income) j = 1 -0.0085 (0.0018)
j = 2 -0.0124 (0.0023)
j = 3 -0.0327 (0.0056)
j = 4 -0.0152 (0.0026)
j = 5 -0.0159 (0.0027)
j = 6 0.0056 (0.0018)
j = 7 0.0207 (0.0034)
j = 8 0.0585 (0.0099)
Number of obs. 2981
lnL(βˆ) -5527.067
significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗∗∗ 1%
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